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CURENCY EQUtrVALENTS
Currency Unit V Won (W)
US$ 1.00 (SAR) V W 800 (as of October 1987)
US$ 1.00 = W 778 (as of September 1992)
US$ 0.001 - W 1
USS 1 million - W 778 million
USS 1336.9 = W 1 million
FISCAL YEAR
January I - December 31
WEIGITS AND EASURES
1 meter (m) = 3.2808 feet (ft)
1 kilometer (km) = 0.62 mile (mi)
1 square kilometer (km2) = 0.3861 square miles (sq.mi)
1 hectare (ha) = 0.01 km2 - 2.4711 acres Jac)
1 metric ton (m ton) - 2.2046226 pounds (lbs)
= 1.1023 short tons (oh tons or 2,000 lbs)
= 0.9842 long tons (lg ton or 2,240 lbs)
PRINCIPALABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS USED
ADB - Asian Development Bank
BPW - Bureau of Public Works of XOC
EIRR - Economic Internal Rate of Return
GNP - Gross National Product
GOK - Government of Rorea
KHC - Korea Highway Corporation
KNR - Korean National Railroad
KRMTFS - Korea Regional Multimodal Transport Feasibility Study
MOC - Ministry of Construction
PCR - Project Completion Report
MOE - Ministry of Environment
MOER - Ministry of Energy and Resources
MOHA - Ministry of Home Affaires
MOT - Ministry of Transport
SMESRS - Seoul Metropolitan Electrified Suburban Railway System
SAR - Staff Appraisal Report
vOc - Vehicle Operating Cost
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=EHORANDUo TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS ANP ThE PRESIDENT
SUBJECTs Project Completion Report on Korea
Kvonnti Reeionul Transport Proiect (Loan 2905-KO)
Attached is the "Project Completion Report on Korea - Kyonggi
Regional Transport Project (Loan 2905-KO)" prepared by the East Asia and
Pacific Region. Part 1I contains the Borrower' s comments.
Loan 2905-KO (US$116 million equivalent of February 1988) was to help
increase the efficiency of transport in the Kyonggi Region, which includes
Seoul and Inchon, two of the country's largest urban areas. Accordingly, the
Kyonggi Regional Transport Project encompassed civil works and consulting
services to improve physical infrastructure in two specific corridors; to
support coordinated transport planning in the Region; and to conduct a number
of traffic management and other studies.
Except for difficulties with land acquisition, a recurring problem in
Korea, implementation was smooth. All physical targets were met in time and
within the estimated cost. Although Government preferred to finance out of
its own resources all technical assistance and studies associated with the
project, the Bank participated fully in the process that led to investment
decisions and policy measures.
The comprehensive PCR summarizes adequately the experience gained
from project inception to completion. Traffic increased faster than forecast,
highway tolls generated substantial revenues, the Korea Highway Corporation
became fully competent in expressway construction and management, and
environmental issues have been resolved with dispatch, effectiveness and
efficiency. Overall the project is rated as satisfactory, its sustainability
as likely, and its institutional impact as substantial.
No audit is planned.
Robert Picciotto
by H. Eberhard KRopp
This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance
of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorizAtion.
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KYONG0I RUIGgIOL TAPSZPQRT KROJECT
lNOA 2905-R0)
PROJICT COMPLETION REPORT
Preface
This is the Project Completion Report (PCR) for the Kyonggi
Regional Transport Project in Korea, for which Loan 2905-RO, in the
amount of US$ 116.0 million equivalent was approved on February 2, 1988.
The loan closed earlier than the original closing date of December 31,
1992. Disbursements under the loan totalled US$ 111.86 million, with
final disbursement made on April 8, 1992. US$ 4.14 million was
canceled effective June iS, 1992, when the Loan Account was closed.
The PCR was jointly prepared by the Infrastructure Division
of the Asia Technical Department (ASTIN), the Infrastructure Operations
Division (EA11N) nf the last Asia and Pacific Regional Office and the
Borrower, and is based, inter alia, on the Staff Appraisal Report (SAR),
the Loan Agreement, supervision reports, the Borrowers own records,
correspondence between tho Bank and the Borrower, and internal Bank
memoranda.
- ii -
MOREA
KYON9GI REGIONAL TRANSPORT PROJECT
,LA 29OS-KO!
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
EvaluatQon Summary
Obi2ctivel
The main objectives were to help increase the efficiency of
transport in the Kyonggi Region byl (a) physically improving the
transport infrastructure in two specific corridors; (b) supporting the
ongoing process of coordination of transport investment p,lanning in the
region; (c) supporting the government's commitment to conduct a Traffic
Management Study in the secondary cities served by the Bank investment;
and (d) supporting the preparation of a comprehensive transport
investment program.
Imulementatign Ssaerlance
overall the project has been a success. All physical
targets were met with no significant delays experienced. The only delay
occurred with respect to land acquisition, but it did not impact the
timely completion of the project. Diligent attention to environmental
issues have produced commendable results.
Although the Bank did not finance any of the technical
assistance or studies associated with the project, there was nonetheless
constant dialogue concerning the studLes and regional action plans as
well as the decision-making process associated with investment in
infrastructure in the area. The Bank was considered a valuable
contributor to these discussions and as a result of continued
involvement was able to draw attention to issues which otherwise would
not have received high priority (specifically those dealing with traffic
management and integrated decision-making).
,ustainabilit4
With traffic increasing at rates faster than forecast in the
SAR, and tolls bringing in substantial revenue to allow the Korea
Highway Corporation (KUC) to finance needed maintenance and operation
activities, it is expected that the expressways will maintain and even
exced the forecast level of net benefits throughout their economic
life. The only issue of note concerns the expressway's connecting
routes, which are outside of the jurisdiction of either the Ministry of
Construction (MOC) or the KHC. Careful attention to the impact of the
expressways on these roads will continue to be necessary to ensure
smooth traffic movement from one level to the other, and to ensure that
focus on traffic safety remains a major endeavor for both project roads
and the inter-connecting roadways.
- iii 
Findingg and Lessons Learned
The main findings and lessons learned include the following:
(a) the importance of timely land acquisition to avoid project
delays;
(b) the difficulty of forecasting traffic growth in rapidly
expanding economies, resulting in estimates which appear to be
too cautious and conservative;
(c) realization that political decisions also play a part in the
design of infrastructure investments, and while technical
issues must remain of paramount concern, they must sometimes
be looked at in more of a political context than a purely
technical one. For example, under this project, the decision
to construct the Topyong Interchange at this time was
politically motivated;
(d) co-ordination and co-operation among agencies and levels of
government in Korea does not come easily or naturally. For
this Project, transport planning and traffic management
activities suffered to some extent from this lack of
coordination, although project objectWves were eventually
achieved. These important activitLes, necesary for project
success, should be reflected in both the Bank documents and
Loan Agreement and supervised with the same vigor as technical
activities;
(e) in the design of projects, care should be taken to identify
those actions which are beyond the control of the implementing
agency, because those actions will require more intensive Bank
supervision. Such components should also be identified as
containing a high degree of risk;
(f) KXC has now become fully competent in expressway construction
and management, with potential for exporting this expertise
beyond Korea. The Bank has been instrumental in molding the
progress of KHC and should be proud of its achievement.
KYONOGG REGIONAL TRANSPORT PROJECT iLOAN 29Q5-KOI
PROJECT COMPLETIOX REPMO
PART I . PAM-CT MMJ)M FM BANS 'PER-SECT21
1. Prolect Identity
Project Name s Kyonggi Regional Transport Project
Loan Number s Ln. 2905-RO
RVP Unit s East Asia and Pacific Region
Country : Korea Loan Amount s US$116.00M
Sector : Transport Canceled Amount s USS 4.14M
Subsector : Highways Disbursed Amount: US$111.86M
Approval Date : 02/02/88 Staff Appraisal s Oct. 1986
Effective Date : 05/04/88 Amendment Date s None
Completion Date s 12/31/91 Total Project Cost:US$448.2M
Loan Account Closing : 06/15/92
Appraisal ERR s 31% Re-assessed ERR: 22%
2. Backoround and Sectoral Setting
2.1 In 1988, when the Kyonggi Regional Transport Project was
appraised, the population of Korea was about 42 million, with urban
population accounting for 65% of the total. High economic growth rates
and the changing structure of the economy had resulted in much of the
population shifting out of the rural areas. While overall population
growth in the 1980's declined to under 1.5% per annum, urban population
continued to increase at more than 5 annually. In 1990, although the
overall population of Korea had risen only slightly, to 43 million, the
proportion of urban dwellers continued to rise, reaching an estimated
72% of Korea's total population.
2.2 Throughout the 1980. the GNP of Korea demonstrated a
consistent vigor. Registering a low of about 5% in 1985, it has
nonetheless averaged an annual growth rate of about 10% throughout that
decade. This has resulted in a tremendous increase in per capita
income, which almost tripled between 1983 and 1990, from US$ 1,914 to
US$ 5,400. Kyonggi Region, which includes Seoul and Inchon, two of the
country's largest urban areas, has contributed significantly to this
economic grcwth and includes a large proportion of the highor income
earners of the country.
2.3 The rapid economic growth of Korea, coupled with increased
levels in disposable income, has strained the transport system. Massive
public sector investments were made in transport infrastructure to
support this growth, with the Government allocating almost 23% of its
total capital expenditure to expand and modernize transport
infrastructure between 1967 and 1977, and about 15% during the Fourth
(1977-81), Fifth (1982-86) and Sixth Plans (1987-91).
2.4 In the years immediately preceding the Bank project (1966-
1985), substantial changes in the modal distribution of traffic had
occurred. The previously dominant role of the railways in freight
transport (82% of ton-km in 1966) had been replaced by a more balanced
Pplit between rail (31%), road (40%) aud coastal shipping (29%). In
pasuenger transport, rapldly expandLng personal incomes generated large
increases ln personal travel, mainly by public transport (both rall and
road), with the rail share declining from 43% in 1966 to 25% in 1985,
and the road share increasLng from 56% in 1966 to 73% in 198S.
2.5 The Government of Korea's (GOK) basic objectim in the 1980os,
to increase and modernlse the capaclty of the transport system in llne
with projected traffLc growth end to avoid major bottlenecks, was
largely achLeved in the period immediately before 1985. The other
otjective, to develop new industrial complexes outeide the Seoul center,
and especially ln the coastal areas to take advantage of a natural
potential in harbors and to exploit coastal shipping, whlle avoiding
excessive congestLon on road and rall, has subsequently been largely
achieved as well. To ensure that appropriate developmental priorities
were zeflected in the allocation of scarce transport resources, the GOK
also reviewed some of its policy measures during this parlod. This
resulted in a lifting of its restrLetive Lcensing system and a re-
assessment of road user charges.
Apraisal onexts The Kvo_ qL _Lon
2.6 The Kyonggl Region, located in the northwestern part of the
country, had a population of about 1S million ina 1985 and 20 million in
1991. The regLon includes thre provinLcial-levl administrative units:
(a) Seoul Clty, the nation's capital, with a population of over 9
mlIlion in 1985 and 11 million in 1991p (b) Inchon City, the country's
second largest seaport, with a population of 1.4 mllion in 1985 and 2.0
mllion ln 1991; and (c) Kyonggi-Do Province, which encircles Seoul and
Inchon, includes the two busiest transport corridors in Korea, namely
the Seoul-Inchon Corridor and the Seoul-Pyongtaek sectLon of the Seoul-
Pusan Corridor. There are also a number of other larger clti4e (with
populations rangLng from 300,000 to 700,000 inhabitants) Lacluding
Suweon, (the provincial capital), Songham, Puchun, and Anyang, and
another fifteen citLes and towns in the province with populations of
over 100,000. The population of the Kyonggi Region (exclusive of Seoul
but including Inchon) was almost 5 million in 1985 and over 6 million
in 1991. The regLon has been consistent in generating over 40% of the
nation's GNP, with Seoul alone accounting for close to 30%.
2.7 The concentration of population and economic activlty in the
Kyonggi Region has resulted in an explosive demand for transport
infrastructure and services. Manufacturing and machinery industries
coupled with the service and infrastructure sectors are predominant.
The growth of Seoul in particular has created many problems, among whieh
the main issue is transportation. In addxtion, the growth in other
regional cities created serious congestion in the regional network,
specifLcally in those locatLons (Suweon is an example) where traffLc
passed through the urban centers. Also, with car cwnership rLsing, 24%
annual increase between the years 1983-1988 for the whole nation, and
35% ln the Kyonggl Reglon alone, there was a marked increase in the
incidence of traffic accidents. The annual increase ln traffic
accidents ln the country grew by an estimated 17% annually between 1977-
88 with the province recording a total 54,000 accidents ln 1988 (21,000
serious accidents and over 2,000 deaths). About half of these accidents
occurred in the cities under the Kyonggi Regional Transport Project.
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Rvonoli Reojon Trananort System
2.8 The transport system of the Kyonggi Region is composed of two
main elements; the road network and the subway/railway network. About
15% of the passenger traffic in the Region either originates or is
destined for seoul. In 1983 15.3 million (one-way) passenger trips were
recorded per day in seoul, with about 2.3 million crossing the city
boundaries. Of these intercity trips, 64% were taken by bus, 19% by
rail and 17% by car and taxi. This represented a 6% annual growth rate
over the preceding several years. Also in 1983 about 362,000 freight
tons/day enoved across Seoul's boundariee, and another 110,000 tons/day
moved circumferentially outside the city. About 88% of this traffic
moved by road and 12% by rail.
2.9 Seoul's network consists of two ring roads, with a third
(beltway) under construction. The Pangyo-Kuri section of the Bank
project is a part of this third ring road. The remaining links are
under phased construction, with completion of the whole ring road
targeted for the year 2001. The Shingal-Ansan section of the Bank
project, also part of this third ring road, allows traffic, in
particular truck traff~.c, to by-pass a number of densely populated
areas, and connect to the Seoul-Pusan Expressway in the central part of
the nation, Inchon on the west, and the Bugok International Container
Terminal (ICD) mid-way.
2.10 The rail network in the Kyonggi region is comprised of two
components; the Seoul subway system (managed by a public corporation)
and Seoul Metropolitan Electrified Suburban Railway System (SMESRS), a
rail comuter system managed by the Korean National Railway (XNR). in
addition KNR's Kyongbu line runs through the region connecting the
northern part of the country with Pusan. Most of the container traffic
on this line is either deposited or picked up in Bugok. Most of the
connecting traffic generated by Bugok travels by road, and specifically
the project's Shingal-Ansan Expressway.
Transeort Plannina
2.11 To deal with rapid growth in the Kyonggi Region two specific
regional development plans were prepared in the early 1980's. The
first, referred to as the Comprehensive National Physical Development
Plan spans a ten-year period. The Region la presently in its third
official Comprehensive National Physical Development Plan (1992-2001).
The framework of the second plan (1982-91), under which this Bank
project was conceived, focused on relieving congestion in and around
Seoul hy introducing appropriate traffic management. This objective
continues under the Third Plan. The second regional plan which focused
on facilitating economic development, is referred to as the Kyonggi
Regional Transport Plan (also known as the Seoul Growth Management Plan,
the Seoul Re-alignment Plan, and the Kyonggi Multimodal Transport Plan).
This Plan, which was prepared between 1985-87, has also been replaced by
a Stage Two Plan for the Region. A review and updating of this Plan
(which covers the period 1991-2001) is presently in progress, with.
completion targeted for 1993. The emphasis on construction of satellite
cities (under the original plan construction wa begun on 5 new towns in
seoul's fringe area including the towns of Bundang, Ilsan, Ponchon,
sanbon and Chundon for a total of 2 million) is expected to continue
mainly to relieve population density and traffic congestion in Seoul.
similarly the focus on improving subway and rail transport is expected
to continue under this plan, encouraging diversion of passengers from
road to rail. A number of improvement envisaged in this plan have
already been implemented, includings (a) the construction of the two
road sections under Bank financang (1991); (b) a double rail track
between Kuro and Seoul (1991) and a new link between Panwol and Kunpo
(1989)s and (e) as well as a number of road widenings and pavement
improvements along intensely used national and provincial roads in the
region. Other projects presently under implemention includes (a) the
construction of the Seoul-Sorae section of the new expressway between
Seoul and Inchon? (b) the Shihung-Nonggok section of the West
expressway; and (c) the Shingal-Munhak expressway. These projects are
targeted for completion between 1993 and 1995. In addition the Asian
Development Bank's (ADS) most recently financed road improvement
project, the construction of the Suweon-Kwangju section (26.2 km) of
National Road No.43, was completed in 1991.
2.12 Beginning in 1969 with 24 km, KHC has gradually taken over
more and more of Korea's expressway network. Since 1991, KHC has been
responsible for the construction and maintenance of all 1600 km of
Korea's expressways; all of which are tolled. The Borrower for this
Loan, the Republic of Korea, provided the proceeds of the Loan to KHC by
means of a Subsidiary Loan Agreement.
3. Previous Bank Involvement
3.1 The Bank's past involvement in the Korean highway sector has
been substantial. Six highway project loans, Amounting to USS690
million have been completed, with one other (Us $200 million) presently
on-going. The Bank's emphasis on sector and subsector work was
initiated in 1984 with the Highway Sector Project (Ln 2392-KO) which
deepened and broadened the Bank's involvement in the roads subsector by
extending assistance to the Ministry of Construction (MOC), the Ministry
of Rome Affaires (MOHA), the Ministry of Transport (NOT) and the
Ministry of Energy and Resources (MOER). The above project provided the
framework for these agencies to improve their planning and coordination
activities, energy conservation policies and land transport
deregulation.
3.2 A Project Completion Report (PCR) on the Bank's Highway Sector
Project (Ln 2392-RO) was prepared in 1991. Overall the project was
considered successful, with only some minor delays in the procurement of
road maintenance equipment. The two main lessons identified included
the importance of (a) using experienced construction superviaors to
implement high standards of quality control, and (b) encouraging inter-
agency coordination. The latter issue has plagued most of the Bank's
transport projects in Korea includLng the present one. However, the
former lesson, high quality supervision, has been wholly embraced by the
GOK in all subsequent highway works. one finding, which has proven to
be true of most of the Bank's transport projects, concerns the
difficulty of accurately forecasting project traffic growth in a country
like Korea, which has had a continuous and very rapid expansion of its
economy. Inevitably, estimates in the highway sub-sector (as well as
the ports sub-sector), have often proven to be too modest and have in
some cases significantly underestimated potential traffLc.
3.3 Another PCR, prepared on the Bank's Provincial and Country
Roads Project (Ln 2228-KO) articulated similar findings and drew similar
lessons.
3.4 The project under review, the Kyonggi Regional Transport
Project was based on the findings of the Kyonggi Region Multi-Modal
Transport Project Feasibility Study (financed under the Bank's 7th
Railway Project, Ln 1836-XO), which identified high priority transport
investments for the Region. It provided the basis for the government's
Regional Comprehensive Transport Plan. This "Plan" was completed in
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1984 and adopted. it called for the following; (a) Road Networks
improvement of transport corridors between Seoul and the urban areas in
the Kyonggi Region, with construction of secondary roads and by-passes
for densely populated areas including arterial and ring roadsl and (b)
Rail Transport: continuous expansion of an integrated network of subway
and electrified rail.
4. Pollaw-on Initiativea
4.1 There are no projects in the sector presently planned for Bank
financing. KHC's expertise in road development is ouch that KHC is
poised for export to other countries. In fact, in a recent poll of
Newly Doveloping Nations (September 1992 issue of the Far Eastern
Economi- Review) Korea ranked second in their ability to export
knowledge and capabilities in the infrastructure sector, second only to
Singapore. Although Korea is well versed in civil works lacks exposure
in the area of soft services, including infrastructure management, use
of computer based information systems, and toll collection technology.
They have in fact requested Bank support in these areas, before
graduation.
5. Thg Proieot
obiectiyeg
5.1 The main objective of the project was to help increase the
efficiency of transport in the economically dynamic Ryonggi Region
around seoul by; (a) physically improving the transport infrastructure
in two specific corridors; (b) supporting the ongoing process of
coordination of transport investment planning in the region; (a)
supporting the government's commitment to conduct a Traffic Management
study in the secondary cities served by the Bank investment; and (d)
supporting the preparation of a comprehensive transport investment
program.
5.2 To assist in the accomplishment of the above objectives, the
project included:
(a) The construction of two four-lane divided, controlled access,
toll expressways. The first, the Pangyo-Kuri expressway,
constitutes part of a section of the Seoul outer Ring Road,
the whole of which is to be completed in the year 2001. This
new 23.8 km expressway with four interchanges and two
junctions provides a dlrect route between the northaastern and
southern areas of Kyonggi Regioa for local traffic and for the
traffic using the Seoul-Pusan Exprossway. The purpose of the
Pangyo-Nuri section was to reduce traffic passing through
downtown Seoul, thus alleviating congestion in that area. The
second, the Shingal-Panwol Expressway, constitutes a section
of the Shingal-Munhak Expressway, the whole of which is to be
completed in 1995. This new 23.4 km four-lane expressway with
three interchanges and two junctions, joins a national road,
recently widened to four lanes, which carries the traffic to
Panwol and beyond and link the container terminal at Bugok to
the national expressway network. The purpose of the Shingal-
Panwol Expressway is to facilitate traffic movement between
the eastern and southern part of Kyonggi Region, and the
industrial port city of Inchon, as well as the new industrial
and university city of Panwol.
(b) Consultant's advisory services for the supervision of
expreuway construction (financed entirely by the Government);
(c) Regular consultation with the Bank in the ongoing process of
coordinating transport planning, and in the preparation of an
investment program for transport in the Kyonggi Region; and
(d) A Government commitment to conduct: a traffic management study
in the secondary cities affected by the new expressways ( a
transportation System Management Program for Seoul was
included in the Bank's Seoul Urb,an transportation Project: Ln
2514-RO).
Dfesian and Oraanization
S.3 The project was designed as a time-slice investment of the
Ryonggi Regional Transport Plan, and specifically a portion of the Seoul
outer Ring Road. Completion date of all of the planned components(including the Bank's portion) remains-the year 2001. The origin of the
Bank's project name, which suggests greater involvement in
transportation planning in the region as a whole, stme from the Bank's
original concept to include substantial technical assistance to the sub-
sector to assist in the development of an appropriate planning system
for the Region including the formulation of a well coordinated process
for decision-making, which would include all levels of government
concerned with inter-modal transport in the area, including the
Ministries of Construction (MOC), and Transport (NOT), the Regional
Municipalities and the Provincial Government. The GMK basically refused
to borrow funds for such technical assistance, but agreed to continued
Bank support in an advisory capacity throughout the planning period.
Close Coordination and cooperation was particularly important to address
issues cone¢rning traffic managemaet on connecting routes. As a result
of Bank-Government dialogue, the Government agreed to prepare a study on
Improving Traffic Management in Kuri, Songnm, anyang and Ansan Cities
on the Pankyo-Kuri and Shingal-Ansan xpressways. Both the Bank project
and the Study were implemented by INC in association with MOC.
Construction was carried out by URC's First Construction Department in
association with its Planning and Coordination Department.
Revisions and Amendmont
5.4 There were no revisions or amendments to the Bank project.
6. Proleat ImlmeMntation
Phvs heal Works
6.1 Implementation of the civil works was carried out on schedule
and without any major problems. All construction work was completed as
of December 31, 1991, with some of the works completed even before
schedule. Total costs of all civil works, including price escalation
allowances but excluding land acquisitlon costs ( para 6.4 below),
were W230.741 bllion (US$296.58 millLon) comparing favorably to
appraisal estimates of W248.812 billion (US$311.01 million). The small
difference ln appralial and actual cost li probably due to the fact that
SAR estimates were based on completed detail engineerig desigsn. of
the works included in the Project (46.7 km), the Bank assisted in the
financing of all but 4.2 km which wao. -;.ttirely financed by KHC from
internal resources at a cost of W48.261 billion (US$62.0 million).
Actign Plans and ptugdle
6.2 Although Bank finances were not used for any of the Transport
Plans or Studies, there was close co-ordination and co-operation between
the Bank and the related Korean ministries, departments and agencies.
The Bank was particularly concerned that regional transport planning
issues peculiar to the area, including inter-modal activities, urban-
rural inter-face and prioritization of inveotments, be addressed within
an appropriate planning framework. It was further concerned that the
decision-making process include close coordination and cooperation among
all the concerned ministries and levels of government, allowing for
adequate inter-face between both the highway and railroad sub-sectors.
The Bank's concern was that such co-ordination and co-operation was
historically unknown in Korea and might prove difficult to implement.
Although the COK stcongly objected to use of Bank funds to finance their
transport plans and studies it was recognized that Bank input would be
a valuable asset to their development. An a result the Bank remained
involved throughout the preparation of these activities. The following
results have been achieveds
(a) preparation of a Traffic Management Study for the area of
project influence. This Study was prepared by RHC with
internal funds, with many of the reccmmendations already
implemented;
(b) improved coordination and consultation between the central
government, the province and municipalities in prioritizing
infrastructure investments, including transport planning for
the whole of the region; and
(c) preparation of a Highway Capacity Study and Highway Capacity
Manual. This was prepared by the Korean Transport Institute
and the Korean Institute for Contruaction with funds provided
by the ADS. The Study was completed ln early 1991 with the
Highway Capacity Manual completed in October 1991.
ProcurmenAt
6.3 Procurement experience under this Project concerned*
(a) ckivl WNok. The two four-lane divided, controlled
access, toll expressways (actual length 46.7 km) which comprised the
civil works carried out under the Project were constructed through seven
construction contracts, six of which (42.5 km) were tendered and awarded
in conformance with the Bank's Guidelines for Procurement through
International Competitive Bidding (ICD) and were financed under the
Loan. The seventh contract (4.2 km), fiawnced entirely by KHC from
their own resources, was tendered and awarded under Local Competitive
Bidding (LCD) procedures. All works were satisfactorily completed
without signficant delays or difficulties despite som early problem
related to land acquisition and later difficulties due to lack of
coordination betwaen different administrative bodies.
(b) Consultin@g ervlces. Construction supervision of civil
works was carried out by JMC with the assistance of local consultants
entirely financed by xeC, using their own resources, which wero obtained
using local procedures. These consultanto provided advice and review
functions and augmented KHC staff with their own personnel. The
performance of both KHC and the consultants in carrying out this work
was very satisfactory.
Costs
6.4 There was an 8% decrease in the cost of construction works
between appraisal estimates and actual expenditures. This is well
within the expected level of accuracy. In terms of consultancy services
and land acquisition, however, there were marked differences between
appraisal estimates and actual costs. The costs of consultancy
services, which were entirely defrayed by KHC from their own resources,
amounted to W2.881 billion (US$3.7 million), compared to the appraisal
estimate of W9.35 billion (USS11.7 million). This large difference is
due to the original estimate being based on expatriate instead of local
services, which was the actual case. Also, with respect to land
acquisition, the appraisal underestimated the cost of land purchase by
more than 40%. The original estimate had been made three years before
actual construction began and in the interim land prices escalated
dramatically. These land costs, which were also defrayed entirely by
KHC with its own resources, totaled W140.635 billion (Us$198.4 million)
covpared to an appraisal estimate of W99.7 billion (US$124.6 million).
Disfbueq=8
6 5 Disbursement experience was generally good, although there was
a slight lag during early implementation. Overall, disbursements
represented 21% of total costs, compared to the 26% projected at
appraisal. The disbursement percentage for civil works as provided for
in the Loan Agreement was 46% of total costs of the civil works financed
by the bank, while in reality it amounted to 43.5%. Considering all
project civil works (including that not financed by the Bank), actual
disbursement represented 34% of total civil works costs. The costs of
consultancy services and land acquisition were entirely defrayed by the
Borrower.
7. Pro?et Results and Lessons Learned
7.1 Overall, the project has been a success. All physical targets
were met and there were no significant delays. The only exception
occurred in the early stages of project implementation when delays in
land acquisition on some road sections did impact start-up timing.
Nonetheless, implementation did proceed without any serious problems
resulting in an earlier than planned project completion for the
originally included project elements. Construction of the Topyong
Interchange, added during the course of project implementation and
financed entirely by KHC using its own resources, is still on-going.
nvirgnmMn
7.2 Diligent attention to environmental impacts during
construction (initiated by the Ministry of EnvironmaAent (MKo)) made this
project a model for similar works. MOB visited the project sate often
to ensure minimum impact of construction on the surrounding areas.
Attention to the noise level resulted in the installation of both
aluminum and reflective barriers to keep noise levels in populated areas
under 65 decibels during the day and 50 at night. As a result of the
attention to noise about double the original length of barrers were
installed along the project route. In terms of resettlement, a total of
4 million square meters (400 hectares) was purchased, involving 3979
individual plots of land and 244 dwellings. A total of 360 families
(1800 people) were relocated. Finally, in terms of construction
accidents there were approximately five accidents per km constructed.
This is considered to be somewhat high. The reason for this high number
has not been determined, however, it may be that the push to complete
construction on or before schedule contributed to this number. Although
there is no specific data at this point, it is expected that the
previous high number of traffic accidents on the existing roads will
decline as a result of the new expressway. However, it has already been
noted, expressways themselves are not immune to traffic accidents.
During the first 9 months there have been 26 accidents (3 fatalities) on
the Pangyo-Xuri section of the Bank's project and 42 (2 fatalities) on
the Shingal-Ansam section. Higher speeds permitted by the new facility
may be a factor.
Technical Assistance
7.3 The Goveroment's unwillingness to borrow Bank funds for
technical assistance, specifically for the Traffic Managment Study, did
not allow the Bank to be as involved in either the Study progress nor
implementation process, as much as may have been warranted. Nonetheless
the Study was completed in December 1990 on schedule, with many of the
recommendations, specifically those dealing with interchange and
intersection improvements, implemented. MOC has already indicated to
the Bank that it will follow-up the process to ensure compliance. The
Bank has reviewed the Study and the recommendations and is generally in
agreement with them, with one exception. This concerns the Topyong
Interchange (which is being entirely financed by INC using its own
resources), where the Bank continues to have ome reservations about the
placsment of this interchange as well as its design. However, the
regional government has insisted on the construction of the Topyong
interchange in the location identified for political reasons, and is
unwilling to consider significant changes.
Economic Analysis
7.4 At the time of appraisal, traffic for the Shingal-Panwol
Expressway was projected to be 28,000 vehicles per day by the year 1991,
the opening year, rising to 49,000 in 2001. For the Pangyo-Kuri
Expressway, traffic by 1991 was projected to be 36,000 vehicles per day,
rising to 57,000 by 2001. It was expected that the growth rate for both
would remain in the region of 5S. In actual fact, in the first year of
the project, traffic has averaged about 30,000 to 40,000 vehicles per
day on most sections, and is now expected to rise to almost 80,000 by
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the year 2001. The growth rate for both roads between 1991 and 1996 il
nlow projected to be about 10%, falling off to about 5% thereafter.
7.5 The economic internal rates of return (EIRM) Zor the civil
works components was estimated at the time of appraisal as 39% for the
Shingal-Ansan Expressway and 24% for the Pangyo-Kuri Expressway. The
combined EIRR was 31% . Vehicle operating cost (VOC) savingo constituted
the main benefits. The revised ElRR, which 1S based on the same
methodology as was presented in the 8AR, has been calculated ao being
25% for the Shingal-Ansan Expressway and 20% for the Pangyo-Kuri
Expressway, with a combined and weighted lIRR of 22%. Although this re-
appraised EIRR differe from the appraisal estimate it nonetheless
mirrors the estimates in the original Korea Regional gultimodal
Transport Study (RRMTFS), which estimated an EIRR of 27% for the
Shingal-Panwol and 18% for Pangyo-Kuri. It io difficult to determine the
reason for the difference in EIRR between appraisal and post-appraisal
because of the lack of base information in both the SAR and the Bank
files. One possible reason could be the exclusion of land acquisition
costs in the appraisal's economic cost estimates and a much smaller
operations and maintenance ratio.
Financial Status
7.6 As anticipated at appraisal, tolls were introduced on both
expressways financed by the Bank, in December 1990. Furthermore, as
discussed in para. 7.4 above, traffic flows have not been affected by
the introduction of tolls and are, in fact, even higher than projected.
7?7 Tolls generated by all exprersways are retained by IMC in
their entirety, and in 1991 were almost double the amount forecast by
the appraisal team. This is in part due to the higher traffic volumes
as well as a doubling of basic toll rates on the project routes (alone)
to ensure adequate user coverage. This has greatly enhanced MEc's
financial position and has enabled the corporation to maintain its
operating ratio at about 31%. At the time of appraisal it was
anticipated that this ratio would be 35S. Although the financial
position of KHC appears to be strong allowing it to easily cover its
operating costs and adequately service its debt, there is little
remaining in the coffer to invest in new construction. As a result XEC
is floating bonds to raise sufficient funds for it. investment program.
Findians and Lessons leaoned
7.8 The following outlines the findings and lessons learned from
the Bank's involvement in the Kyonggi Regional Transport Project:
(a) the process of land acquisition should be started as far in
advance of project implementation as is possible, and at least
a year before, so that there are no undue project delays.
Furthermore, to avoid undue delay, alignments should avoid, as
much as possible, highly populated arasp7
(b) when determining the appropriate growth rate for traffic in a
country with a rapidly expanding economy like Korea, it is
easy to be too modest and to underestimate the rate. More
attention should be paid to experience in previous projects so
that projections more accurately reflect the country
situation;
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(c) transport projects are by their very nature political. It is
necesoary to realize that some decisions are made solely for
political reasons, and that these reasons may be as compelling
as any others which may exiot. The Topyong Interchange is
being constructed at this time by KXC (using its own
resources) primarily for political reasons, using in the
Bank's opinion, a less than optimal design configuration which
has been dictated partly by cost considerations and partly by
inadequate available land area. While the Bank has made its
reservations known, basically the situation has been accepted.
(d) construction of regional expressways requires coordination
and cooperation among a number of ministries and levels of
government because it crosses many jurisdictions. However,
clous coordination and cooperation among agencies does not
come easily in the Korean context and was unsatisfactory
during the implementation of this Project, causing les than
optimal execution of transport planning and traffic management
tetivities, although project objectives were eventually
achieved. A provision outlining specific goals and
achievements should have been incorporated into the project
document and/or loan agreement, with judicious follow-up to
ensure suaceusu
Ce) ln the design of projects, care should be taken to identify
those actions which are beyond the complete control of the
implementing agency, because those actions may require more
intensive Bank supervision. Such components should also be
identified as potentially having a high degree of risk; and
(f) XHC, with many years of Bank support, has succeeded in
graduating to a position where they have become the foremost
experts in Xorea on the construction of expressways, and have,
in fact, reached the stage where they are likely candidates to
export this expertise to other developing countries in Asia.
8. ue,tain. bil.IU./emainL,, Issues
8.1 With traffic increasing faster than forecast, and RHC well
versed in the need for adequate maintenance, it is expected that the
expressways will maintain or even exceed the forecast level of net
benefits throughout their economic life. The final success of the
construction component depends on the continued growth of the Korean
economy providing a spur to the growth of traffic and on the timely and
adequate provision of maintenance funds to keep the expressways in good
condition. with respect to the latter, both expressways are tolled, and
all of the revenue collected remains with KSC.
8.2 The only remaining issue concerns the roads at the end of the
interchanges, which are outside the jurisdLition of either NOC or XHC.
Although the Traffic Management Study has been completed, implementation
is left wholly up to the municipalities concerned, Including the
financing of any of the recommendations. Given the contrained budgets
of these municipalities, they may not be able to implement the
recommendations in a timely manner. MOC has indicated that it has sent
copies of the report's findings to each of the concerned municipalities
and plans to follow this up with a formal letter, strongly encouraging
them to implement the study's recmmendations in order to realize the
full potential of the expressway benefits.
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8,3 The other outstanding issue, which concerns Korean roads more
generally is the issue of traffic safety. MOT figures show that in 1991
there were 13,429 fatalities on roads in South Korea, or nearly 37
people per day. The nation's accident rate is third highest in the
world after South Africa and Portugal. South Korea's roads and traffic
management systems have become inadequate for the recent explosion in
car ownership with about 540 new cars per day registered in Seoul alone
in 1991, and with new registrations nationally running at nearly 2,100
per day, adding to the 5 million vehicles preently on the roads. There
is an obvious need to address the issue from a national perspective,
with a comprehensive review of all measures, from driver testing to road
use itself, warranted.
9. Bank Performance
9.1 Bank performance was very good throughout the project cycle.
However, this must be tempered by the fact that KIC has become a
sophisticated agency, implementing high caliber works, responsive to
Bank suggestions and willing to engage in dialogue with concerned
agencies. The Bank did provide a continuity of involvement, with a
minimum of staff change. Supervision was regular and staffed with
appropriate expertise.
10. Borrower ME121MUr2an
10.1 The Borrower and its implmnting agency, in this case RHC,
performed well during the project. They eased the task of project
preparation by readily providing the information requested and their
performance during project implementation was very good.
11. Project Relationshins
11.1 The excellent relationship that has existed between the staffs
of the Borrower and the Dank goes back many years. During the
preparation and implementation of this project, this relationship
developed even further and becam one of the key factors which
contributed towards the success of the project. It created good
teamwork, in which each party displayed flexibility to allow for
successful achievement of the goals.
12. Protect Documentation and Data
12.1 The covenants contained in the Loan Agreement were reasonable
and the Borrower complied with them. In addition, the staff appraisal
report provided a useful reference framework during project
implementation.
12.2 X8C has kept excellent records of the project, and these have
been well organized and accessible to the Bank. This has enabled the
Bank to review the project eaily and prepare the project completion
report without any complication.
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PART 11. PROJECT REVIEW FROM TEE BORROWER'S PERSPECTVEE
A. Conditions Leadina to tbh Proiect
In 19S3, during discussions on transport sector development
with the GOK, a consensus emerged on the importance of coordinating and
integrating the different modal transport plans for the Kyonggi Region.
Recent government spatial policies had emphasized the high priority
given to the dispersal of the large population of Seoul by promoting
urban growth centers to the south and east of the city. Emphasis was
also being given to the location of major new highways and rail lines to
influence future settlement patterns as well as provide improved access
to the city. The results of these discussions led to the formulation of
the first Kyonggi Multimodal Transport Plan (also known as the Regional
Transport Plan) which identified a number of priority investments to the
year 1995, and of wihich the prtosent Bank project under review, the
Kyonggi Regional Transport Project, is an integral part (para. 2.11).
The main purpose of the project, from the Borrower's
perspective, was to facilitate traffic flow by inter-connecting the main
urban roads as well as the Kyungbu and Central EZjpreusways, and ease
traffic circulation in the metropolitan areas in the Kyonggi Region.
S. Main rindinas and Lessons Learned
The following includes the findings and lessons which were
identified by IRCs
(a) Since 1970 RHC has received much technological assistance from
the Bank, in addition to the financial assistance. This has
enabled them to enhance their skills;
(b) The Bank has significantly influenced the development of the
traffic management plan for the Kyonggi Region, and has been
instrumental in helping the goezrnment focus on the need for
the preparation of tnese plans in a timely fashion; and
(c) The Bank has also been instrumental in assisting in
coordinating activities between the various agencies. It
influenced inter-actiond between some nine agencies involved
in the project, by encouraging coordination.
C. Summary of Da"k Role and Performance
The Bank promptly responded to all problem which arose and
adopted a flexible approach in it. administration of the project; for
example, approval of local contracts. Since the Executing Agency was
experienced in the implementation of similar projects, the flexible
approach adopted by the Bank enabled smooth implementation of ach
oomponent. The overall success of the project can be, therefore,
attributed, in part, to the good performance by Bank staff during the
whole project cycle. During implementation supervision missions were
sent to Korea on a regular basis, about once per year, with the final
project review carried out by the PCR mission in September/October 1992.
These review missions aptly highlighted the issues and recommended
solutions to the various difficulties affecting implementation. Staff
changes were kept to a minimum, thus enabling good relationships to be
built up over the project period. Dlibursemet of the loan proceeds
were prompt, with the contractors receiving thoir paymnts in a timely
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manner. The Bank's performance throughout the prWaration and
implementation phases of the project war very satisfactory.
D. lEvaluatign of Rorroweg's 2On Performance
The performance of the Borrower (the Korean government) and
the Executing Agency (IWC) in implementing the project was generally
satisfactory. The Executing Ageny, with experience in other similar
projects, contributed significantly to the efficient implementation of
the project. The management of the project was also efficient and the
staff assigned to it were both qualified and competent. The required
facilities and equipment were provided in good condition and on time.
Difficulties were encountered with one important aspect of
project implementation, that is acquisition of the right-of-way. With
risLng land costa and increased legal action on the part of the land
owners, land acquisition posed cms problems during the early stages of
project implementation. However, RHC vigorously pursued purchase with
the result that all necessary land was acquired without incident.
E. Remaining Isuges
Financinq from government sources has been steadily
diminishing, thus KHC has sought external funds to implement their
projects (they have floated bonds). Although IKC is quite confident in
its abilities to construct civil works, it is less confident in its
ability to implement management systems, computerize its operations
(introduction of MIS/OI8), and carry out adequate maintenance functions.
In these specific areas it requires external assistance, and would
appreciate continued assistance frcm the World Bank.
- 15 -
.
P
PART III . g=sg X= o
- 16 -
Tabl- It ULATSD BANK LOANS AND/OR CREDITS
ighay Ptoj"et To conrat 372 km of nat hways 1971 Completted PCI Isued:
(Loa 769-XIO) bewen Chooj id un: feasibIlity PPAR No. 3045
uld &WWE eaghinerin of 1,400 km and of luno 1980
1,100 km respectively: s highway maIntnane
study esablishment of a pi maiasmce
ownization and puirhs of highway
Highway U To assist Govenm's 1972-76 rod 1974 Comphled PCR Isued:
(Loan 956&KO) conestruction and paving program and to expand PPAR No. 3045
road mdantanm organizaton. To consuct of Jun 1980
naional highways fiom Samal to Gangreng (97
kmn) and Gangreun to Mukho (33 km); pae and
Improve 634 km of astiona highways: proce
maint_e equpmet and carty out feasibit
tdi and dead enginsee of 1,000 kma of
natonAl and provincial oads.
Highway Im To atr for growing taffic On the hgwy 1976 Comd PCIm IWed:
(Loa 1203-KO) ayaen by extending the netor ofal weather PPAR No. 5024
paved highways (800 kin) between the ain of Apil 1984
ente of popuatin ad early out feablty
stui and deti engineering (1,200km) to
prpa fiture proecs. 
Hhway IV To it in improving the highway ysm by 1979 Complted PCK iUed:
(Loan 1640.C) eedIn the ntwork of paved hihways by WPAR No. 5450
some 1,230 km and by prepaing a progrm for of Febqay 1985
impovim the maneane aNd develpmet  of
_________ the provi ad county tun) road stm.
Provcial and To ass the Bonrwer to improve 1982 Compled PCR issud
County Roads 1,000 bk of county (pu) or tqia network PPAR No. 8372
(Loan 2228) toads dthiruhout the counry ond to esabish and of Febray 1990
equip appropria maienance ; aizions for
___________ th provncial and country road networks.______ _______
gway Setr To assthe dGoverm in Incteaing effcieny 1984 Complted PCR iss
Prect ia its highway mtor through improvement In PPAR No. 9243
(Loan 23924C0) invmnt pannig, transport eultnt of Deemer
pdring, and energy conevaon. 1990
Road To inre tnport capiy duri the Sith 1989 Ongi Approved
1mpovme Pin perod (1987-91) by upporting tm May 16, 1989
(Loa 3061-PH) pdricipal road-relatd Governmen objete:
(a) enhancing transport efficiey by upgading
the urfa Nd alinmdnt of exstng nd and
by impoing rd mainteance ad operations;
O) expadin traffic capacity by widening reeds
and (c) incasing traffi safety.
._.= - T-.
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Sub!196 4 7 NWlOITW 0*.
)_vewl 1985 4 7 NHaIOhIB u
Oa_19S6 1 n VA
Ann"
m 197 3 t0 IWIII 
bb*9S 7 to SVL0AC u.
Jun.1987 1 ; EC w.
Aut 1967 2 1o TSIBC u.s
Oct 1968 2 3 mmI 1
Ap 9I9 4 7 T&ADATRSD 1 Dmky1Smuust.s 2
Noombw I98 2 2 II 1mr
.wuuy ,1991 2 2 1VB1 1
Setombw 1991 2 7 HEWIA 1
o 1A92 4 N10OA UK
O E- fD*AW 1gme L L Oficer
FA - Fblmu AhuIt OA - Op_nE. A1u1
SC. somE Ts s EngoaNr
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TIbl 3: STATUS OF LEOAL COVENANTS
;Agrcmn Section. Desciption of Co.nn .tte Co. .e.nts:
3.01(a) Provide KHC with funds, hailties Complianc
servimes and other resources
3.01(b) Renld proceeds of loan to KHC under Complanc
Subsidiary Loan Agemet
3.04(i) Fumish the Bank with daft of ansport Compliance Disouion betwen Bank
elements to be included in the Capital and MOC hold during
Region Implementation Program for PCR preparation meeting.
1988/96.
3.04(ii) Rcevw with the Bank yeady progress Complianc
in the exeoution of tanspost elm of
the Progam.
3.05 Cay out sudy on improvement of Compianc
traffic system in Songnam, Suwon,
Kui and Anyang
3.05 Implement rocommendations of the See nots Traffi manaeme
study measures within the
seodary Cities ar not
liy to be impleented
unless MOC take the
necsary actions.
4.01 Submit audit reports including Compliance
Statement of Expenditure
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T 4: CUMULATIVE BSTIATED AND ACIUAL DISEURSENT
#stEndiU$ 19 A pdi41361
L) atN "X R4m L 
Decembe 31, 1987 .
Juve 30, 1988 10.0 10.0 100.0
Doembei 31, 198 18.0 10.0 55.6
June 30, 1989 26.0 28.5 109.6
Deoaber31, 1989 38.0 34.0 895
June 30, 1990 64.0 S2.8 82.5
Deember31, 1990 88.0 81.0 92.0
June 30, 1991 96.0 96.1 100.1
December31, 1991 103.0 186.7 103.6
June 30, 1992 110.0 111.9 101.7
December31, 1992 116.0 _
Date of final disbusemen Aprl 8, 1992
7 Fbl1 INANCING PLAN
(.SS miSsI)
Thpex away onsUutcon
Pano-Tongbu (8 3J4 51.1 60.3 111.4 41.9 54.5 ff.4
H} (Kodo) - Kui 54.0 54.0 . 64.8 64.8
Shingal - Panwl 56.4 66.5 122.9 54.4 70.8 125.2
Suevision of coamon - 11.7 11.7 . 3.7 3.7
PaVo-Ton8bu blj as 4.0 4.8 8.8 6.6 8.7 15.3
Hag (Kodto) - Kuti - 4.2 4.2 3.2 3.2
Shinga - Panwol 4.5 5.2 9.7 8.9 11.S 20.4
Suprvbsion of oonstrcon . 0.9 0.9 . 0.6 0.6
Right-of-way aup - 124.6 124.6 - 198.4 198.4
T. d ,. - - ! . 116.0 332.2 44.2 111.9 417.2 529.0
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: PROIECT COST
(won millin)
Pangyo-Kuui (23.5 kmn) 67,230 65,110 132,340 75,89 38,428 114,320
Lot 1 (5.6 kmn) 14,197 7,189 21,386
Lot 2(C7.9 kmn) 15,648 7,924 23,57
Lot 3 (5.8 kin) 15,535 7,866 23,401
Lot 4 (4.2 kin) 30,512 15,449 45,961
Sbingal-Ansan (23.2 kim) 49,940 48,360 98,300 58,943 29,846 88,789
LotS5 (7.2 kin) 22,016 11,148 33,164
Lot 6 (9.3 kmn) 25,341 12,832 38,173
Lot 7 (6.7 kun) 11,586 5,866 17,452
C~io~sa~C~tdms
physical 6,330 5,670 12,00 8,604 6,759 15s3"
Price 3,630 3,26 6,890 8,023 4,246 12,26
Right-of-Way Acquisiton 99,700 
- 9,700 140,635 
- 140,635
Supersion of C;onstruction 9,35 - 9,5 2,881 - 2,881
Grand Totas 236,180 12400 328,580 294,978 79,M27 374,27
IAZ~~ m S6kn 417 719 28&
Tahb 7: DETLED PROJECT COST
PANGYO-KURI AND SHINGAL-ANSAN EXPRESSWAYS PROJECT (LOAN NO. 2905-(0)
LOIS Si t2 7126 t.W 1 3 921 - 1*221.4 out* *m 231 2- 23.1 UB tU 33*1 ?i tS D A.. . )0J4b 27.2 *6.4 Ob.2 204 . 26.344 26.26 IS 41 t34ttl 6104Itas IS Jt b 
. .4 M.M.. 2." 32s79 21.sm :s.1n . sm8 
1*4 42 UnLI. . )"tI 82. 343 8 48.3 . . 48.261 0416 Ws.1*6 S8 UsX D*il 18.82 10L.34 . .".5A" O412 o8 41.4 . 4Lgl4 <.lm MMs MO*3*6 ~~~93 ami 
. 3o* 38.373 (CAM12 462611 42.6? 42.1 42.67 3.38 MM38 lo"3*? 4.? tUe SI * £1.43? (50.rg1To(3"s3 30 (4 _ _I) _ 19.26W 1.2 _ .D _ I
ftadd 44. 28.4 6138 @.13 oft74s) UklUj 15341 23D.14 79.2 109 o
1 
_)6 
_
3.30 ~~~27.41 2 1A6
* omilo 
_ __ _ 24.32 16.3 23.43 230.741 230343 l lD,4 20.45l 5.278 381 
am mm 1914* VW4 Vt5 . IM38 .1 IJ 21 2.8 2.33 2* .* 
1323 232.2
ekTcmi 53* ).3 l41 1.3 131 .9 #1 8&0= .I 
-
_ _ 
== 
_ _ . _ .
-
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Table PROIECF IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE
Complete
Geneal Pocuremnent 06/15/87
09/03/87
Issue prequalification (PQ) documns for conators and 10131187
get responses
Evaluate PQ submissions, including Bank review 11/01/87 12/23/87
Terms of reference for superision consultants 07/01/87 11/11/87
Panevo-Tonebu (Shiniane) and Shingal-Panwol 07/01/87 01104/88
exDres"v
Bidding documents, including Bank review 07/01/87 01/04/88
Bid period 12126/87 02/23/88
Evaluation of bids, including Bank review of evaluation 01/25/88 02/03/88
report and KHC recommendations
Rcquest propos for supervision consultanois and soleot 12/15/87 02/22/88
oonsultants, including Bank teview
Construotion of expressway 02/01/88 12/07/91
Hail (KgdoKRuri gELxpeswa &SWoi
(fimded by Government)
Engineering documents 03102/88 12/31/91
Constucdtion of xpressway 02/01/88 1W07/91
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TIabI9 PROJECT MONrMRING INDICES
P ' '''c' Component Bsiao ""nite " Act':"" 'ual; 
PIanvo-Kuri Exoswav
Lail
Earthwors (in) 2,506,000 2,884,464
Paving (mi) 147,000 151,857
Cules (no.) 36 49
Bridges (no.) 17 16
Fmal cost (W bln) 50 26
Earthwors (m') 2,437,000 2,027,908
Paving (mi) 173,000 124,513
Culvet (no.) 44 39
Bridgs (no.) 11 11
Final cost (W bin) 65 26
Earthworks (mn) 2,097,000 2,090,981
Paving (Mn) 150,000 108,927
Culvors (no.) 72 55
Bridges (no.) 11 13
Fuua cost (W bln) 48 27
!,Lot 4
EarthwNokb (m) 1,026,700 1,108,776
Paving (m) 62,000 45,547
Culverts (no.) 19 22
Bridges (no.) 2 4
Final cost (W bln) 56 42
ShhnLJMl Exosv
LoLl
Earthvodks (Mn) 3,644,000 4,037,383
Paving (m) 232,000 219,513
Culvets (no.) 62 66
Bridges (no.) 12 13
Find cost (W bln) 47 41
Eartliworks (tnS 4,612,000 4,564,605
FPving (ml) 206,000 179,907
Culveru (no.) 46 S0
Bidges (no.) 14 15
Fina comt (W bln) 55 43
Earthworkb (ms) 3,054,000 3,031,525
Paving (Ml) 159,000 147,607
Culvets (no.) 62 49
Bridges (no.) 6 6
Funl cEo (W bin) 37 19
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TAbk 10: STUDIES
.. tudies w ......... PPutpose ats Defied it Appaisal ...
Traffic Mangement The proposd expresways would dircy Compled
Study in Secondary affect e pattans in seveal satlit December 1990.
cities around Seoul citis around Seoul, especially Anyang, Kui,
Songnam and Suwon. These secondary cities
are expanding apily into commercial aNd
industdal centers, and traffic systems manage-
ment will be needed to avoid congesin and
ransport relabd polluon.
Highway Capacity Study The growth of trffic is beginning to cause Compleed with
unacoptLble loveb of congestion and delays on assistance from
many part of the Korean bighway network ADB.
which is expoetd to become particlay
sever in tie Kyongg region. The geometric
desig of the highways has been based on the
U.S. Highway Capacity Manual, but it became
increasingly evide that U.S. taffic flow
relationships are not dircy applicable to
Korean conditions becaue of the high propor-
tion of truc in the traffic sue nd major
differences in vehicle perfomnce and ddiving
chaacteistics. Miisty of Constucton thus
intends to conduct a study leading to the
development of a Korean Highway Capacity
Manual.
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Table I1: TRAFFIC VOLUME, 1991t92
.o1 ,ak .... .. Due Tru.k
Roue Suikm Volume' %: -Voab . % V.1hm . % Volume %
Pangyo-Kuri Pangyo - Seongnam 24,322 100 13,149 54.1 2,183 9.0 8,990 36.9
Expressway
Seonnam - SOnWg 29429 100 16,711 S6.6 2,410 8.2 10,408 35.2
Songpa- Scobanam 40,058 100 21,720 54.2 3,654 9.1 14,684 36.7
Hal - Xuri 36,687 100 19,518 53.2 3,090 8.4 14.079 38.4
Shingal - Ansan Shingal - Dongsuweon 55,927 100 27,061 48.4 6,119 10.9 22,747 40.7
Expressway
Dongsuweon - Busksuweon 49,267 100 13,642 48.0 5,271 10.7 20,354 41.3
Buksuw.on - Bugok 40,408 100 19,180 47.5 4,503 11.1 16,725 41.4
Bugok - Banwcol 38,507 100 18,564 48.2 4,375 11.4 15,568 40.4
Banw,ol - A. a 32,034 100 15,713 49.1 3,706 11.6 12.615 39.4
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Tabe 12: KHC-MANAOED NETWORK, 1991
. __= :11--R =
| Routo4N i :th No. DIb of
' ,' ..,(kin) '-', of' .: :'peF^ 'ed.,s.; ': ton
___ . : _.... _ _ __.
Seoul-Inchon 24.0 20.4/36.0 4/8 80120 Doc 1968
Seoul-Pusan 428.0 22.4 418 80-120 Jul 1970
Eonyang-Ulan 14.3 22.4 4 80-120 Doc 1969
Taejon-Jorju 79.5 23.4 4 80-120 Dec 1970
Shingal-&Semal 104.0 13.2 2 80-120 Nov 1971
Jonju-Sunchon 172.3 13.2123.4 2t4 70-120 Nov 1975
Sunchon-Pusan 176.5 13.2J23.4 214 70-120 Nov 1975
Saemal-Kangnung 97.0 10.7 2 50-120 Sep 197S
Kangnung-Tonghae 41.7 10.7/13.2 2 50-120 Sep 1975
Taegu-Masan 86.3 13.2123.4 214 70-120 Doc 1977
Pusan-Masan 20.6 23.4 4 80-120 Sep 1981
Taegu-Kwangju 182.9 13.2 2 80-120 Jun 1984
Hail-Nami 123.6 23.4 4 100- Dec 1987
Pangyo-Kuri 123.5 23.4 4 120 Deoc 1991
Shingal-Ansan 23.2 23.4 4 100 Dec 1991
Total 1,597.4
Table 13 TOLL RATES AND USER B1NEF1
Passenger cars,
trucks < 2.5 t 180.1 27 15.0
Buses 212.2 46 21.7
Trucks < 10 t 270.8 30 11.1
Trucks > lot 376.5 60 15.9
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Tble14 KOREA HIGHWAY CORPOtATION: INCOME STATEMENT (1987-91)
(Won n)llio)
1987 *989 199)7 $A
vv2z,....;. :s; ; t9 ~i64 Aw A;4 'sV ;X}.1 aW
'~ - '- '.p. VRL- ' 0;v I'' "'"'- a t - -
o 172.460 182472 196.100 21| .9 22.64 271.152 250 323.772 27625U 406.99i
O a _____ 23.213 36.206 _4.20_ 2$_ 8._82 19.299 9291 31.924 9.61 56,774
Total RaWs 195613 18.6 23030 243.7U 234.6 290.451 "5l981 355.6 286,1l 4.77
_~~~- - . .. _
°___________ 60.819 58.815 | 0 04 78,710 79,777 84|,00 86.343 89,S00| 99.855
-A_u --Weal gmga 6,917 6.941 S,366 8,939 8.950 1M115 9,050 14,666 10.210| 18,742
O_ - 22.098 28,201 26.282 14.585 840 2.561 950 10.966 990 24.438
Subtol 9.34 93.957 108.8 92.598 88.500 94. 94.000 111.5 I01.OX 143.035
Jasoagi 762 1.215 -. 0 7.703 7,100 2.175 14.400 3.937 |2.400 3.046
Odin 2.901 19.025 3,00 4.8 -.5 7.301 3. 6 9.904 3.620 1017.i52
SulaW 3,663 20,40 12.000 12251 10.650 9.476 18.000 13.U1 26.020 110.898
Tc iddaaua 93,497 114.197 120.20S 104.U9 99,150 10S.6S9 112.001 125.816 12. 253.93
bIncs Bohn TOM 102.176 104,481 110.0 1.3 135.476 186.752 147.911 229.880 159.145209.837
hm, 6.447 4,477 7.730 5.813 8.940 15.76 9.760 25.171 10.500 44.444
A*teTaxtacem 95.729 100.004 102.365 133.060 1256 171,376 138S221 204.709 14S.64 165,393
cal covay 92,793 97,348 99.29O 129.041 122,740 163807 134W 1.084 144.11 152.456
Nat b 296 2. 3.07S 4,019 3,7S6 7,169 4,141 10.62S 4, I 12,937
Inlud sOpei overnm alo aon of W 160,176 milion for Chuabu E uaay in 19848, and equa amount for
ti n W"it_e
-28-
II. KORSA HIGHWAY CORPORATION. SOURCES AND APPLCATIONS OF FUNDS (1987-91)
(Won milrion)
__ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ -9 8 198 I 990 l T : T 1
maR CashRA' A'mm 't A' ''
95,729 100.004 1026 133.060 126X6 I7137I 138.1 204,709 48.64 165,393
P|. dapm tao 13,248 23.8" 16.700 17,4 17.100 32t 17,100 29,334 19.30 137.1
Sublotal voh gmudin 108.977 123.984 119.065 150.460 13636 203,91 143. 23443 67 303,014
ove maihAdo 90,000 90.000 200.007 45.000 100.000 8l0 100,000 84.100 0.000 240.65
__ loon 30.000 34.000 27.814 27,200 50 27.200 116,697 15.300 464.412
Tatal &emgm 198,977 243.9S4 353,065 223,274 270.81J 333.91 270.836 435 3,245 1.008.076
111g.wienngmd 221.645 213.S96 201.400 164,SSS 2400 26,199 240,400 353.371 .900 1,070.713
KycAggIR (A 6,100 1.273 127.200 95.842 122,700 139.246 122.700 165.916 71.600 544,9
Odoa 215545 212.323 7420 69.04" 117.700 116.95 117.700 18745 7530 526.14
H i_whup _ vano 21.,47 24.90S 3630 612 77.100 48,993 77.100 61.100 52.300 S2S02
o c e _ apitalaimu 19.571 13.634 23,300 22,312 10.600 24,951 10.60 40.618 29.100 63.182
SubroW i|weatmuls 263.063 252,135 261.000 225.812 328.100 330.143 328.100 455.089 28.300 1,216.697
oapadidtw 6,227 7,493 . . . 5.019 81,63 . 7,59
irviB. (a RD) | '1,993 2.133 2,000 7,977 2,000 37,317 2,000 11,24 2,000 18,012
*in ncacawotla (72506) (17,777) 90.065 (11.31) (59264) (38,6) (59,264) (112,94 52,94f 34.142)
Tot Aplladm 198.977 243.914 39,3065 22,274 270,836 333J911 270,836 435,040 83,245 1.00_,076
/a. Incldig Abt - aaw" fi o m-.1 - _ - , -f r I b_loan.
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Table 16: KOREA HIGHWAY CORPORATION: BALANCE SHEET (1987-91)
(Won million)
liiij 1999~i 199 11 991
l ~~~ ~~ ~~SAR Acd AAR c S A AOi sA I AcUW I SA R Ac.l
CufrentAaaca
Qu;ck _ ma| 482 12,343 20.000 6,798 20,000 75,200 20,000 94,141 20.000 275.696
Invutonrea 4,479 2.622 I 4.000 I 1.736 4.000 2,208 4.000 3,701 4000 4.998
Other egrent_aa 1f 26.232 17,150 3.000 3.097 3.000 1.603 3.000 2.059 3 000 1,599
Total Curent Asct 31,193 32.115 27.000 11.631 27.000 79.011 27.000 99,901 27.000 282.293
Lms: Curent liabllt
_ayablea and cd 123,111 69.365 28.846 S4.4Q5 88,110 130.957 169,489 29.249 169.489 700,493
Iiabilte
CuwTenportat long-t 1.993 2,132 2.000 2.921 2.000 37.318 2.000 10.858 2.000 18,148
debt
Total Curnt Liabilities 125.104 71A97 30.846 62.326 r 90,110 168.275 171,489 302.107 171.489 718,641
Net Workig Capital (93.911) (39.382) (3.S46) (50.695)1 (63,110) (89,2f4 (144.489) (202,6 (144.489) (436.348
Fixed Ae,_
Highways (at coat 995,016 973.462 1,196,416 1",23.211 ,436,816 1,598. 1,694.316 2.093.664 1,941.216 3,245,398
Other (net) 62,177 64,S22 51.777 84,722 99.4n 102,211 149.677 130.536 178077 173.0S0
Total Fixed Asta 1,057,193 1,037,984 1.248.193 1.377.933 1,536,29 1.700,81O 1,843.993 2.224,200 2.119,293 3.418.448
Total Aacta 963.282 998.602 1,244.347 1 .327.238 1 .473.183 1.611,55 1.699.504 2,021,994 2,027,749 12.982,100
abilIbdU esnd Equity
LOgtenadbt: IBRD 34.000 3.303 61,2001 9.089 83,20C 25.300 98,500 59.052 | 76.649
Ote 46,531 39.813 44I1I 68,6 42.531 9.251 40.531 11552 38.531 745.160
Equity 916,751 926.736 1.165,816 1,8,891 1,369,452 1.470,725 1,575,773 1,760,305 1,575.773 2,160.291
0 ~ - - - - - - - l- -
ToW LabiliWes ad Equty 963.282 998,602 1.244.347 1,327,238|1,473,183 1,611,5 1,699,504 2.021.994 2.027.749 2.982.100
/a Lnluding wort-in-progroas for Chung-bu Expressway.
ATTACHMENT
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